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  “Although large public corpora-
tions are certainly the most visible mani-
festations of the corporate form, they are 
not the most common”.1 This observa-
tion could serve as the starting point for 
the inquiries that concern the authors 
contributing to this volume. In the con-
text of the much debated and criticized 
model of the publicly traded corpora-
tion,2 the contributors to The Govern-
ance of Close Corporations and Part-
nerships explore the regulatory and pol-
icy challenges of the small and middle-
sized enterprises (SMEs), closed (or 
close) corporations, limited liability 
companies (LLC) and limited liability 
partnerships (LLP). Based on an interna-
tional conference in 2001, their papers 
bring together the latest legal and eco-
nomic assessments of these forms of 
business association. 
The volume provides a welcome 
addition to international scholarship in 
this field of company law. The book’s 
editors, Joseph McCahery, Theo Raai-
jmakers, and Erik Vermeulen, are lead-
ing authorities on corporate law in 
                                                 
*  Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto. 
1  C. Nicholls, Corporate Law (_, 2005). 91. 
2  See only the successful launch of Joel 
Bakan’s The Corporation 2004), first pub-
lished as a book, subsequently turned into a 
film. 
Europe and the United States (US). The 
void they fill may be illustrated by a cur-
sory example from some recent legal 
literature: “There is a distinction be-
tween a private and a public company. A 
public company must have a minimum 
issued share capital … A public com-
pany may, but a private company may 
not, offer its shares for sale to the pub-
lic”.3 Such a pithy observation hardly 
captures the complexity of private com-
panies in today’s dynamic corporate en-
vironment.4 As the changing economic 
realities of closely held corporations 
continue to challenge the traditional le-
gal categorization of corporate forms, 
only a comprehensive assessment of 
their legal and economic milieu can pro-
vide an adequate picture of the close 
corporation. This volume succeeds in 
introducing the key issues raised by the 
law of close corporations and partner-
ships, while exploring the subject-matter 
from a variety of theoretical angles. 
The book is well-structured and 
easy to navigate. It begins with an excel-
lent introduction by Joseph McCahery, 
followed by 15 chapters grouped into 
four themes.  
Part I of the book, dealing with 
the first theme, explores the “Theory of 
Partnership Law and Close Corpora-
tions”. It commences with the republica-
tion of Henry Hansmann’s and Reinier 
Kraakman’s seminal article, “The Essen-
tial Role of Organizational Law”.5 Other 
important chapters in this section include 
“An Economic Analysis of Shared Prop-
                                                 
3  J. Lowry and L. Watson, Company Law 
(Reed Elsevier 2001), 1.16. 
4  See only P. DiMaggio, ‘Introduction: Mak-
ing Sense of the Contemporary Firm and 
Prefiguring the Future’, in The Twenty-First 
Century Firm (P. DiMaggio ed., Princeton 
University Press 2004), 3-30. 
5  Originally published in (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 
387. 
erty in Partnership and Close Corpora-
tions Law”6 (John Armour and Michael 
J. Whincop), “Waiting for the Omelet to 
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression in Close Corporations”7 (Ed 
Rock and Michael Wachter), and 
“Bracketed Flexibility: Standards for 
Performance Level the Playing Field”8 
(Claire Moore Dickerson). 
Of the other three parts, the sec-
ond addresses the “Evolution of Partner-
ships and Closely Held Partnerships”, 
with contributions from Larry Ribstein,9 
J. William Callison,10 and the editors 
McCahery and Vermeulen.11 The third 
section offers a distinctive comparative 
perspective, addressing “Legislative Re-
form Initiatives in the United Kingdom 
and the United States”. It includes chap-
ters by Deborah DeMott,12 Judith 
Freedman,13 Geoffrey Morse,14 Allan 
Walker Vestal,15 and Donald Weidner.16 
                                                 
6  Previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corpo-
ration Law 983, as part of the Symposium 
on “Unincorporated Business Entities”. 
7  Originally published in (1999) 24 J. Corpo-
ration Law 913. 
8  Previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corpo-
ration Law 1001. 
9  “The Evolving Partnership”, previously pub-
lished in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 819. 
10  “Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and 
the Limited Liability Movement: The Coy-
ote Howled and the Herd Stampeded”, pre-
viously published in (2001) 26 J. Corpora-
tion Law 951. 
11  “The Evolution of Closely Held Business 
Forms in Europe”, previously published in 
(2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 855. 
12  “Transatlantic Perspectives on Partnership 
Law: Risk and Instability”, previously pub-
lished in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 879. 
13  “Limited Liability Partnerships in the United 
Kingdom: Do They Have a Role for Small 
Firms?”, previously published in (2001) 26 
J. Corporation Law 897 (with V. Finch). 
14  “Limited Liability Partnerships and Partner-
ship Law Reform in the United Kingdom”. 
15  “Drawing Near the Fastness? The Failed US 
Experiment in Unincorporated Business En-
The fourth part and theme of the volume 
concerns “The European Private Com-
pany and Partnership Reform in the 
European Union”. It features chapters by 
Robert Drury,17 Theo Raaijmakers,18 and 
Peter Essers and Gerard Meussen.19 The 
book closes with the text of the Euro-
pean Private Company Draft Regula-
tion.20 
For some time, the study of the 
governance of private companies21 
seemed a quiet backwater of legal re-
search and policy reform. The noisy 
calls for corporate governance reform in 
the aftermath of financial scandals such 
as Enron, Worldcom and Tyco22 further 
drew policy-makers’ and scholars’ atten-
tion away from the regulation of SMEs 
and its variants. The international debate 
over convergence or divergence of cor-
porate governance regimes has been 
driven primarily by the integration of 
global financial markets and subsequent 
pressures on rules of corporate financial 
transparency and control. Close corpora-
tions remained – for a long time – un-
                                                                   
tity Reform”, previously published in (2001) 
26 J. Corporation Law 1019. 
16  “Pitfalls in Partnership Law Reform: Some 
US Experience”, previously published in 
(2001) 26 J. Corporation Law 1031. 
17  “Private Companies in Europe and the 
European Private Company”. 
18  “The Reform Agenda for Partnerships and 
Closely Held Companies in the Netherlands 
and the European Union”. 
19  “Taxation of Partnerships/Hybrid Entities”. 
20  See further S. Braun, “The European Private 
Company: A Supranational Company for 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises?” 
(2004) 5 German L. J. 1393. 
21  For the historical background of the distinc-
tion between the public and the private 
company, see Nicholls, note 1, 92-97. 
22  See the excellent account by W.W. Bratton, 
“Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value”, (2002) 76 Tulane L. Rev. 1275. 
touched by this discussion and legisla-
tive reform.23 
Recently, themes such as mini-
mum capital requirements, disclosure 
rules and minority shareholder rights 
have in various ways preoccupied na-
tional regulators and reformers in the US 
and European Union (EU) member 
states.24 Those developments are richly 
documented and analyzed in this vol-
ume. The discussion in Europe was fa-
cilitated by several seminal decisions of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
These rulings seriously undermine the 
so-called ‘Real-Seat theory’ (i.e., the ap-
plicable law is defined by the place of 
the company's central administration), 
which had for many years thwarted any 
meaningful discussion of the merits (and 
dangers) of regulatory competition in 
Europe.25 National company law re-
gimes governed the incorporationas well 
as the size and formation of the firm’s 
minimum’s capital requirements.26 With 
                                                 
23  G. Bachmann, Grundtendenzen der Reform 
geschlossener Gesellschaften in Europa, 30 
Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und 
Gesellschaftsrecht (_ 2001), 351 at 351. 
24  See the chapters in this volume by Raai-
jmakers, Vestal, Weidner and Callison, 
Freedman, Morse, and McCahery and Ver-
meulen. The latter, in “The Evolution of 
Closely Held Business Forms in Europe” 
(previously published in (2001) 26 J. Corpo-
ration Law. 855), comment: “While scholars 
have debated the advantages of private com-
pany statutes for more than a decade, the 
discussion of competition-based lawmaking 
for limited liability companies in Europe 
presents a new departure”. 
25  See already D. Charny, “Competition 
among Jurisdictions in Formulating Cor-
porate Rules: An American Perspective on 
the ‘Race to the Bottom’ in the European 
Communities” (1991) 32 Harvard Inter’l 
L. J. 423. 
26  See O. Kahn-Freund, “Some Reflections 
on Company Law Reform” (1944) 7 
Modern L. Rev. 54 at 57: “at the present 
moment, it is almost unbelievably easy 
the Real-Seat theory preventing legal 
recognition of firms incorporated in 
other member states, companies in the 
EU effectively did not enjoy freedom of 
movement. Therefore, one could not 
speak about a market for corporate char-
ters – such as had long been the case in 
the US. 
Since the ECJ rendered its rul-
ings in Centros (1999), Überseering 
(2002) and Inspire Art (2003),27 a new 
climate for regulatory reform has 
emerged in the EU. But numerous regu-
latory and policy barriers remain. In 
Germany, for instance, a plethora of res-
cue attempts were made in the wake of 
Centros to maintain the hegemony of 
German company law over foreign cor-
porations operating in Germany.28 The 
pressure in Germany to adapt the new 
legal situation was particularly high.29 It 
is against this background, that the de-
bate over regulatory competition and 
freedom of choice in EU company law30 
                                                                   
and even more unbelievably cheap to 
form a corporation in this country.” 
27  See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophan-
del en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. In-
spire Art Ltd. For analysis, see H.C. 
Kersting & C.P. Schindler, “The ECJ's In-
spire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 
and its Effects on Practice” (2003) 4 Ger-
man L. J. 1277. 
28  See only H. Halbhuber, “National Doc-
trinal Structures and European Company 
Law” (2001) 38 Common Market L. Rev. 
1385. 
29  The latter might be documented by the 
ongoing and recently increased attempts 
to reform the minimum capital require-
ments of the German Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH – Limited 
Liability Company); see hereto P.C. 
Leyens, “Company Law in Germany – 
Recent Developments and Future Devel-
opments” (2005) 6 German L. J. 1407 at 
1409. 
30  S. Deakin, “Regulatory Competition ver-
sus Reflexive Harmonisation in European 
Company Law”, in Regulatory Competi-
is acquiring a more prominent place 
among EU company law scholars and 
policy-makers.31 This development also 
highlights the particular regulatory chal-
lenges that follow from the type of cor-
poration forms that prevail. 
 
 
In his introduction, McCahery 
discusses the current challenges faced by 
reformers on the corporate law applica-
ble to SMEs. His overview begins with 
the recognition that a single type of lim-
ited liability corporation cannot meet the 
specific demands that follow from busi-
nesses’ commercial operations in differ-
ent markets. The private company, the 
close, or closely held corporation – in 
contrast to the large, publicly held cor-
poration – is evolving into different 
forms of limited liability companies 
(LLC) and limited liability partnerships 
(LLP). But while legislative reform has 
greatly improved the range of organiza-
tional flexibility, the need for an ade-
quate regulatory framework of SMEs 
has increased. It seems that with every 
step towards a further reduction of the 
corporate owner’s personal liability, the 
fundamental question resurfaces of how 
to effectively guarantee the protection of 
minority shareholders and creditors. 
Concurrently, reformers must determine 
the appropriate balance between organ-
izational freedom and regulatory protec-
                                                                   
tion and Economic Integration. Compara-
tive Perspectives (D.C. Esty and D. 
Geradin eds, Oxford University Press 
2001) 190. 
31  To assess the dramatic changes to the 
early beginnings, see only C. Schmitthoff, 
“The Future of the European Company 
Law Scene”, in The Harmonisation of 
European Company Law (C. Schmitthoff 
ed, London 1973) 3, highlighting the cru-
cial importance of harmonized company 
laws for the European market. 
tionism. McCahery (later jointly with 
Vermeulen in the volume) rightly points 
to the traditional reluctance of many na-
tional lawmakers to improve their com-
pany laws. The tension between the An-
glo-Saxon enabling approach to corpo-
rate governance, and the continental 
European emphasis on mandatory com-
pany law rules,32 unfolds just as power-
fully in the closely held corporation as it 
does with the large, public corporation. 
The volume is also distinctive for 
the reconsideration some contributors 
give to the long-standing nexus-of-
contracts theory of the firm.33 They do 
so in light of the dynamics between the 
emergence of the unincorporated firm 
with limited liability, on the one hand, 
and private equity investors’ desire for 
high standards of corporate governance, 
on the other. It is this tension that de-
fines the SME compared to the larger, 
public corporation, where the traditional 
lines of conflict run between the dis-
persed shareholders (or, increasingly in-
stitutional investors) and the company’s 
management. 
Hansmann and Kraakman in their 
chapter explore this tension by revealing 
the Janus-faced nature of limited liabil-
ity. They distinguish between two forms 
of corporate asset partitioning to meet 
creditors’ claims. The first form, “af-
                                                 
32  J.W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Re-
form, Regulatory Politics, and the Foun-
dations of Finance Capitalism in the 
United States and Germany, 1 CLPE Re-
search Paper Series No. 01 (September 
2005), 7-11.  
33  The original theory was developed by 
M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, “Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, 
(1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305; and A.A. Al-
chian and H. Demsetz, “Production, In-
formation Costs, and Economic Organiza-
tion”, (1972) 62 American Econ. Rev. 
777. 
firmative asset partitioning”, prioritizes 
the claims of creditors against assets 
held by the company with whom the 
firm contracts in its own name. And only 
secondarily, if ever, will the claims of 
personal or business creditors of the 
firm’s owners be met. Thus, affirmative 
asset partitioning creates a distinct fund 
for the firm’s creditors, thereby giving 
them a prior claim on the firm’s assets 
before the owners’ personal creditors 
can realize their claims. In contrast, “de-
fensive asset partitioning” shields the 
firm’s owners’ assets from creditors’ 
claims against the firm. In this form, 
limited liability shields investors’ per-
sonal assets. In both cases, limited liabil-
ity distinguishes between the firm’s and 
the owners’ assets, but the perspective 
differs in each case. While the latter fo-
cuses on the traditional model of limited 
liability (limiting the investors’ risk 
while augmenting the creditors’ risk), 
the former strengthens the position of the 
firm’s creditors. 
While Hansmann’s and Kraak-
man’s central contention is that property 
law eventually renders a better under-
standing of the limited liability firm than 
contract law,34 their distinction between 
defensive and affirmative asset partition-
ing in fact illustrates much more. From 
the perspective of creditors’ rights on the 
firm, not only does the specific nature of 
the business entity become apparent, but 
also the nature and scope of the norms 
governing this entity.  
Regulatory (jurisdictional) com-
petition versus state intervention is a fur-
ther important concern of many con-
tributors in this volume. Ribstein under-
lines the relevance of regulatory compe-
tition that many perceive as having been 
notably strengthened through the ECJ’s 
Centros decision. He highlights the ex-
                                                 
34  Hansmann and Kraakman, note _, 26 
ample setting role of the US in allowing 
“‘horizontal’ jurisdictional competition 
to facilitate market-testing, variety, and 
evolution of laws”. He elaborates that: 
“the best path for Europe is to facilitate 
competition regarding business associa-
tion laws rather than eliminating compe-
tition through ‘harmonization’”.35 But 
Ribstein does not share the enthusiasm 
about the Centros case law in Europe, 
because he fears that “significant differ-
ences” continue to remain between the 
US and the EU. He is not convinced that 
Centros fully set aside the Real Seat 
doctrine: “inherent legal, cultural, lan-
guage, historical, and other differences 
among European countries may play a 
greater role in constraining firms’ ability 
to choose from among different jurisdic-
tions”.36 Europe’s ways, then, may con-
tinue to follow different paths from those 
of the US. While Ribstein postulates that 
“[m]arkets, and not government, have 
the wisdom to guide firms in an uncer-
tain world”,37 in his view the EU is some 
way off from the type of regulatory 
competition pervasive in the US.  
Indeed, not everyone has 
strongly supported regulatory competi-
tion.38 While the generous availability of 
limited liability to small firms and part-
nerships – e.g. the introduction of the 
LLP in the United Kingdom (UK)39 and 
                                                 
35  “The Evolving Partnership (previously pub-
lished in (2001) 26 J. Corporation Law. 
819), 185. 
36  Ibid, 185-6. 
37  Ibid, 187. 
38  The debate has been going for a long time. 
For its beginnings in company law, see W. 
Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Re-
flections Upon Delaware” (1974) 83 Yale L. 
J. 663; R. Winter, “State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion” (1977) 6 J. Leg. Stud. 251. 
39  See the contributions from Freedman, 
Morse, and McCahery & Vermeulen, in this 
volume. 
the enactment of LLC statutes by US 
state legislatures40 – can provide inves-
tors with a flexible investment vehicle 
with attractive financial incentives, it has 
its drawbacks.41 Other policy instru-
ments must rectify the loss of security 
and monitoring leverage over the firm 
engendered by limited liability. Judith 
Freedman and Geoffrey Morse review 
this problem with regard to the UK, 
while J. William Callison critiques the 
supposedly firm theoretical basis for fa-
voring limited liability corporations. 
Joseph McCahery and Erik Ver-
meulen in their chapter recognize the 
obstacles in the EU for regulatory com-
petition. But while their declared goal is 
“to extend the debate over regulatory 
competition to closely held organization 
forms”,42 they argue that this alone will 
not suffice. “Solving the problems of 
European company law will take more 
than the introduction of competition be-
tween member states”.43 The authors ex-
plain that though the recent blows to the 
EU’s Real Seat doctrine may create “in-
centives for governments to create better 
business organization vehicles”, national 
company laws retain significant differ-
ences concerning minimum capital re-
quirements and public disclosure rules.44 
Striking differences among company law 
regimes throughout the EU continue to 
hinder attempts to move the EU Com-
pany Law agenda forward.45 And yet, 
                                                 
40  See the contributions from Ribstein, Calli-
son, Vestal and Weidner in this volume. 
41  Callison, note _ , 254 explains: “It has been 
widely noted that corporate law limited li-
ability provisions create incentives for ex-
cessive risk-taking by permitting corpora-
tions and their owners to avoid the full costs 
of their activities”. 
42  McCahery and Vermeulen, note _, 193. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid, 194. 
45  P. Zumbansen, “European Corporate Law 
and National Divergences: The Case of 
the momentum for change is in place, 
induced by stock corporation and securi-
ties law reforms among other pres-
sures.46 Demands among foreign institu-
tional investors and other stakeholders 
are pushing all EU states inexorably to-
wards better disclosure rules and corpo-
rate financial transparency.47 
Yet, McCahery and Vermeulen, 
after reviewing regulatory changes in the 
UK, France and Germany, observe that 
“the linkage of public corporation law to 
closely held corporations is likely to be 
inefficient”.48 This leads not only back 
to the debate about the economic effi-
ciency of extending limited liability to 
close corporations,49 but it also touches 
on the scope and shortcomings of the 
draft European Private Company (EPC) 
prepared by an international group of 
business leaders and legal experts. 
McCahery’s and Vermeulen’s verdict is 
as short as it is decisive: offering insuffi-
cient default rules that can be readily 
applied and too few incentives for corpo-
rate reorganization, the EPC is imbued 
with “the EC company law inertia”.50 
However, even an incomplete regulatory 
competition might provide some incen-
tives for national legislators to learn 
                                                                   
Takeover Law”, (2004) 3 Wash. U. Glob. 
Stud. L. Rev. 867; J. Wouters, “European 
Company Law: Quo Vadis?” (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review 257. 
46  See, e.g., M. Rhodes and B. van Apeldoorn, 
“Capital Unbound? The Transformation of 
European Corporate Governance”, in Theo-
ries of Corporate Governance. The Philoso-
phical Origins of Corporate Governance (T. 
Clarke, ed. Routledge, 2004), 243. 
47  J.W. Cioffi, “Restructuring ‘Germany Inc’: 
The Politics of Corporate Governance Re-
form in Germany and the European Union” 
(2002) 24 Law & Policy 355. 
48  McCahery and Vermeulen, note _, 206. 
49  See Hansmann and Kraakman, Wachter and 
Rock, and Ribstein in this volume 
50  McCahery and Vermeulen, note _, 208. 
from their neighbors. With their eyes 
close to the ground, McCahery and 
Vermeulen believe that “as Europe en-
ters the competitive law making envi-
ronment, lawmakers will mainly focus 
on the needs of business firms that are 
most likely to engage in forum shop-
ping”.51 The numerous incorporations of 
“German” firms under the rules of Brit-
ain’s LLC must thus be seen in direct 
correlation with the increased attention 
given in Berlin to reforming the Gesell-
schaft mit beschränkter Haftung. The 
authors’ note that the work of the quasi-
private corporate governance commis-
sion has brought about the largest 
changes in German (public) corporation 
law since the last major reform.52 
Finally, this volume is significant 
for its contributions to the debates about 
the supposed efficiency and democracy 
of the limited liability corporation. Calli-
son, following McCahery’s and Ver-
meulen’s chapter on EU developments, 
traces the dramatic extension of limited 
liability privileges to partnerships in the 
wake of the rise in importance of limited 
liability companies in the US.53 Callison 
identifies the origin of this development 
as the decoupling of partnership tax clas-
sification from personal liability, 
achieved when the US Internal Revenue 
Service granted limited liability compa-
nies favorable partnership taxation. 
Thereafter, most states in the US enacted 
limited liability partnership (LLP) stat-
                                                 
51  Ibid, 222. 
52  See T. Baums, “Reforming German Corpo-
rate Governance: Inside a Law Making 
Process of a Very New Nature”, interviewed 
by Peer Zumbansen for (2001) 12 German 
L. J. 2. 
53  See especially W.W. Bratton and J. McCa-
hery, “An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the 
Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of 
the Firm and Regulatory Competition” 
(1997) 54 Wash. & Lee L. Review 629. 
utes. Callison revisits the lobbying and 
legislative processes behind the reforms, 
and is critical of the heavy influence of 
business lawyers at the expense of other 
voices that would have illuminated bet-
ter some of the potential costs of extend-
ing limited liability.54 He is also critical 
of much of the law and economics the-
ory and its claims about the efficiency 
enhancing effects of limited liability on 
smaller companies.55  Callison believes 
that that theory was built around the ex-
periences of large, publicly traded com-
panies and was not originally intended to 
apply to SMEs.  
Callison’s critique goes even fur-
ther to challenge the nexus-of-contracts 
theory. Drawing on theory ranging from 
communitarian social theory to critical 
legal scholarship, Callison questions the 
application of the individualistic, nexus 
of contracts doctrine to the closed corpo-
ration and the partnership, now equipped 
with limited liability.56 He believes that 
the nexus-of-contracts theory wrongly 
assumes people to be rational and ego-
oriented actors without social ties or 
moral obligations. Consequently, the 
theory inappropriately separates the cor-
poration and its shareholders from their 
broader socio-economic and cultural en-
vironment. Limited liability in this con-
text reverses the traditional corporate 
law understanding, “in which the part-
nership is viewed as acting on the part-
ners’ behalf of and under their control 
and in which partners have unlimited 
liability”.57 
Callison’s chapter achieves the 
rare result of presenting us with no sim-
                                                 
54  Callison, note _, 253. 
55  See, above all, F. Easterbrook and D. 
Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corpo-
rate Law (__, 1991). 
56  Ibid, 266. 
57  Callison, note _, 262. 
ple answers but instead highlights the 
ambiguities inherent to most arguments 
in the debate: “theoretical bases for ex-
tending limited liability protection to 
unincorporated business organizations 
are uncertain and indeterminate.58 Ar-
guments can “be made for efficiency and 
for inefficiency, for autonomy and for 
community, for democracy and for limits 
on equal treatment”.59 This captures well 
the lessons to be learned from this rich 
volume. 
Overall, The Governance of Close 
Corporations and Partnerships will likely 
become a key reference for future re-
search into the structure and the regula-
tory challenges of the close corporations. 
While many of the chapters were already 
published, the editors have assembled, 
edited and added to the existing litera-
ture to produce a book that both sea-
soned scholars and students of company 
law will surely find very useful. Further, 
the book should appeal not only to com-
pany lawyers in the EU and US, but also 
to people in other jurisdictions including 
Canada where similar regulatory chal-





                                                 
58  Ibid, 268; see likewise McCahery and Ver-
meulen in this volume, at 217: “Because 
there is little empirical evidence to support 
either the efficiency or inefficiency of lim-
ited liability for closely held firms, this is a 
very complex question to which there is no 
straightforward answer” (with reference to 
Bratton and McCahery. note _). 
59  Callison, note _, 268. 
